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Energy security is increasingly becoming a major focus in the world today. For 
developing countries, energy security is limited by lack of access to resources and critical 
infrastructure. Recent natural gas discoveries in Sub-Saharan Africa are creating energy 
development opportunities. At the same time, the increased global interest is forcing 
developing countries to choose an energy strategy that either prioritizes domestic 
consumption or export of energy resources. The strategy a government chooses affects 
the overall energy security of that country. 
This thesis seeks to explain why countries pursue energy strategies that focus on 
domestic consumption of indigenous energy resources instead of export. To answer this 
question, case studies of the energy sectors of Tanzania and Mozambique analyze the 
factors influencing the choice of energy strategy. 
This thesis finds that the primary factors influencing energy strategy choice are 
political party competition, the country’s economic strategy, and international 
relationships. Analysis of the case studies indicates that the combination of political elite 
cohesion, economic reforms that favor the domestic energy market, and structuring the 
influence of international actors in policy development enables the development of the 
domestic energy sector. 
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Thirty percent of the world’s natural resource discoveries in the last 10 years 
occurred Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries like Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Mozambique join natural resource producers like Nigeria and Angola in the pursuit to 
balance growth and domestic energy security.1 The purpose of this thesis is to explain 
why countries pursue energy strategies that focus on domestic consumption of energy 
resources instead of export. By analyzing the political context of energy resource 
development, the overarching economic strategy, and international relationships of 
Tanzania and Mozambique one can predict the pattern that leads to a strategy choice. The 
strategy a country chooses affects the domestic energy security of that country. 
Tanzania and Mozambique have taken different approaches to energy security. 
Tanzania’s decision makers promoted the domestic use of energy resources to enhance 
the country’s energy security, and the success of the inward-focused energy strategy was 
a result of consistent and coherent policies that balanced the influence of energy sector 
elites and private interests.2 Mozambique’s response to its energy insecurity and recent 
natural gas discoveries has been to prioritize the export of energy. The outward-oriented 
energy strategy was established because the fractionalized political elites were more 
susceptible to external pressure to export energy and less responsive to domestic demand 
for energy.3  
                                                 
1 “African Growth Among Discoveries of Natural Resources and Infrastructure Investments,” Eni for 
Expo, accessed May 10, 2016, https://www.eni.com/it_EX/eni4expo/pages/eng/african-growth.html. 
2 Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (New 
York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001), 154. 
3 Jason Sumich, “The Party and the State: Frelimo and Social Stratification in Post-Socialist 
Mozambique,” Development and Change 41, no. 4 (July 2010): 693, 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01653.x; 
Lindsay Whitfield and Alastair Fraser, “Negotiating Aid,” in The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for 
Dealing with Donors, ed. Lindsay Whitfield (Oxford, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), 15–16; Lindsay 
Whitfield and Alastair Fraser, “Introduction: Aid and Sovereignty,” in The Politics of Aid: African 
Strategies for Dealing with Donors, ed. Lindsay Whitfield (Oxford, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), xxxix. 
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In addition to the differing political dynamics that influenced the energy strategy 
in Tanzania and Mozambique, the macroeconomic strategies shaped the options available 
to each country. While both countries have attempted to transition to a market-oriented 
economy, Tanzania, unlike Mozambique, has implemented sub-sector policies that have 
increased the amount of local small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the 
domestic energy market. Mozambique’s economic strategy favored mega projects and 
large foreign investors that were focused on the export of energy resources, which 
inhibited the internal demand to develop the domestic energy supply. 
For developing countries to progress out of poverty at the hands of natural 
resources, an economic and political framework must be in place to achieve a balance 
between access to energy, the environment, and sustainable growth. Enhancing energy 
security within developing countries is expected to reduce poverty, improve the quality of 
life, and allow for increased education opportunities. Connecting urban and rural areas to 
a power supply will also encourage a better investment environment. Capacity building to 
stabilize the economy through strengthening political and economic institutions is critical 
for sustained development. Foreign governments, private corporations, and international 
organizations promote and support the transparent reporting and monitoring of contracts, 
resource revenue, and investment, which foster social trust in state governments and 
state-run utilities.4  
Access to reliable and affordable electricity through energy resource development 
is expected to break the poverty trap of many developing countries. Sub-Saharan Africa 
has abundant sources of energy, renewable and non-renewable; however, most countries 
depend on hydropower and biomass fuels (wood and charcoal), which are vulnerable to 
drought and deforestation.5 To achieve universal energy access by 2030 and further 
reduce poverty, Sub-Saharan Africa needs a generation capacity increase of 13% per year 
                                                 
4 “What Is the EITI?” Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, accessed August 11, 2015, 
https://eiti.org/eiti. 
5 Ogunlade R. Davidson, “Energy Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa: Future Directions,” Annual Review 
Energy Environment 17 (1992), 361, doi: 10.1146/annurev.eg.17.110192.002043.  
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along with $20B U.S. of investment each year specifically for electrification.6 New 
discoveries of energy resources will provide increased revenue but with more than 60% 
of the population living on less than $2.50U.S. per day it remains difficult to afford 
electricity.7 The availability of energy resources in conjunction with improved 
infrastructure used for domestic power generation should help to create self-sufficient, 
energy secure countries that can fully capitalize on the energy resource export market.8  
Challenged by similar energy deficits, Tanzania and Mozambique face the 
decision of choosing a strategy to develop their energy sectors.9 Both countries 
potentially stand at the forefront of the energy market with recent and vast resource 
discoveries. By comparing how each country’s government controls access to resources, 
promotes privatization, and interacts with the international community, I argue that one 
can explain why a government would choose an inward or outward-oriented strategy to 
develop the energy sector.10 Being able to explain how governments chose an inward 
energy strategy could provide a policy framework for other resource rich countries as 
well as guidance on how to advise countries seeking to enhance their domestic energy 
security. From the analysis presented in this thesis, one can also determine the factors that 
lead governments to use natural resources sources for domestic consumption, thereby 
ensuring domestic energy security, or for international export, potentially leaving the 
domestic energy market vulnerable.  
                                                 
6 Morgan Brazilian et al., “Energy Access Scenarios to 2030 for the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan 
Africa,” Utilities Policy 20, no. 1 (March 2012): 10, doi: 10.1016/j.jup.2011.11.002. 
7 Africa Progress Panel, Power People Planet: Seizing Africa’s Energy and Climate Opportunities, 
Africa Progress Report 2015 (Geneva: Africa Progress Panel, 2015), 12, 
http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/publications/policy-papers/2015-africa-progress-report/ 
8 Davidson, “Energy Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 363. 
9 Christopher Helman, “The 10 Biggest Oil and Gas Discoveries of 2013,” Forbes, July 8, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/01/08/the-10-biggest-oil-and-gas-discoveries-of-
2013/; Maria Berg, Marit Agasoster, and Erling Grammeltvedt. Natural Gas in East Africa (Norway: 
Department of Petroleum Engineering and Applied Geophysics, Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology, 2012), http://www.ipt.ntnu.no/~jsg/undervisning/naturgass/oppgaver/Oppgaver2012/ 
12Berg.pdf. 
10 Africa Progress Panel, Power People Planet, 115. 
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Enhancing energy security for developing countries is more than securing 
investment through global energy demand. The focus of this thesis looks beyond the 
overall development potential and analysis how abundant resources are used to enhance 
domestic energy security. In 2013, major natural gas discoveries were made in Tanzania 
and Mozambique. Both countries have produced natural gas since 2004 but in limited, 
non-commercial quantities. Since 2004, Tanzania has increased its domestic energy 
supply from 10% to 24% of the market and increased total electrification from 11% to 
36.4% of the population.11 During the same period, Mozambique has increased energy 
access to 20% and electrification to 16% despite doubling production capacities.12  
Global demand for energy resources is increasing. While the global energy market 
is moving toward reducing the dependence on fossil fuels, primarily oil, the international 
community continues to explore perspective resource sites, especially Sub-Saharan 
African. Diversifying energy resource suppliers is also a byproduct of geopolitical 
situations in the Middle East, which are making access riskier and more costly.13 The 
access opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa have the potential to cause a scramble for 
land and off-shore drilling rights, but increased interdependence is improving regional 
and international partnerships to ensure a sustainable, diverse energy supply that is 
beneficial for all participants.14  
Energy security is increasingly becoming a major focus in the world today. The 
choice to prioritize domestic energy security has long-term development implications. 
                                                 
11 United Republic of Tanzania, The Draft National Energy Policy 2015 (Tanzania: Ministry of 
Minerals, 2015), 4, http://www.mem.go.tz/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/NATIONAL-ENERGY-POLICY-
2015-Feb-2015.pdf. 
12 “Mozambique Energy Situation,” Energypedia, accessed August 4, 2015, https://energypedia.info/
wiki/Mozambique_Energy_Situation#Introduction; “Mozambique: Balances for 2013,” International 
Energy Agency, accessed August 10, 2015, https://www.iea.org/statistics/ statisticssearch/
report/?country=Mozambique&product=balances; “Mozambique: Balances for 2004,” International Energy 
Agency, accessed August 10, 2015, https://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/ 
report/?country=MOZAMBIQUE&product=balances&year=2004.  
13 Bert Kruyt et al., “Indicators for Energy Security,” Energy Policy 37, no. 6 (2009): 2169, doi: 
10.1016/j.enpol.2009.02.006; Dieter Helm, “Energy Policy: Security of Supply, Sustainability and 
Competition,” Energy Policy 30, no. 3 (2002): 178, doi: 10.1016/S0301-4215(01)00141-0. 
14 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (New York: 
Penguin, 2011), 229. 
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Growing energy demand and interdependence in a global energy market mean more 
economies are vulnerable to external influences and volatile markets.15 For developing 
countries, an overly inward focused energy strategy can insulate governments from 
exploitive relationships and volatile prices. With increased interest and investment, 
balanced energy strategies will enable countries to diversify their energy sectors, which 
could further enhance domestic energy security. Energy security in Sub-Saharan Africa 
could emerge from the improved energy strategies and policies associated with a stable 
supply of energy, but this outcome depends on governments making the choices 
necessary to pursue balanced strategies.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following sections review the theoretical framework used when analyzing the 
energy security and development of Tanzania and Mozambique. 
1. Energy Security 
Energy security is a concept routinely discussed but is not clearly defined. The 
International Energy Agency’s (IEA) definition of energy security is the foundation of 
the current understanding of energy security, which is the affordable access to reliable 
energy.16 Enhancing energy security requires a strong energy sector based on a sound 
energy strategy and effective energy policies because energy security affects the political, 
economic, and social aspects of every country. A common challenge for energy policy is 
simultaneously balancing energy, the environment, and growth; typically, only two of the 
elements progress at one time.17 Beyond the common definition of energy security, many 
studies attempt to break down the aspects of energy security into smaller more 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 343. 
16 “Energy Security,” International Energy Agency, accessed July 20, 2015, http://www.iea.org/ 
topics/energysecurity/.  
17 Helm, “Energy Policy,” 173; Robert Springborg, “Egypt: The Challenge of Squaring the Energy—
Environment—Growth Triangle,” in Routledge Handbook of Transitions to Energy and Climate Security, 
ed. Robert Looney (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2016), 1, http://relooney.com/NS4301/Egypt-7-29-
2015.pdf. 
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quantifiable factors, to the point that there are now more than 50 definitions of energy 
security.18  
Winston Churchill’s speech on the eve of World War I changed the collective 
perspective on energy security. Since then experts agree that diversification of energy 
suppliers and fuel types ensure and enhance energy security.19 The consensus among 
energy experts is that four fundamental factors are the base energy security: availability, 
affordability, efficiency, and environmental conservation. Primarily, scholars focus on 
the broad scope of energy security of developed countries and the energy supply 
implications on national security and foreign policy.20 An additional focus area of 
scholars looks at the effect of diversifying domestic energy systems where countries have 
an abundance of energy resources.21  
In recent years with the growing concern over global oil dependence, research is 
starting to look at energy independence. The field looks at the various aspects of 
countries with resource abundance and the correlation between resource dependence.22 
Scholars arguing for energy independence indicate countries that prioritize using 
indigenous energy sources for energy security are less vulnerable to disruption or price 
shocks in global markets.23 Even though the same scholars agree that complete energy 
independence is unrealistic, the research presented encourages countries to develop 
                                                 
18 Yergin, Quest, 266; Benjamin K. Sovacool, “Introduction: Defining, Measuring, and Exploring 
Energy Security,” in The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security, ed. Benjamin K. Sovacool (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 34–35. 
19 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85 no. 2 (March-April 2006): 70–71, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-03-01/ensuring-energy-security.  
20 Benjamin K. Sovacool and Marilyn A. Brown, “Competing Dimensions of Energy Security: An 
International Perspective,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 35 (November 2010): 102, doi: 
10.1146/annurev-environ-042509-143035. 
21 Xianguo Li, “Diversification and Localization of Energy Systems for Sustainable Development and 
Energy Security,” Energy Policy 33, no. 17 (November 2005): 2243, doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2004.05.002. 
22 Frederick van der Ploeg and Steven Poelhekke, “Volatility and the Natural Resource Curse,” Oxford 
Economic Papers 61, no. 4 (2009): 728–29, doi: 10.1093/oep/gpp027. 
23 Gail Cohen, Frederick Joutz, and Prakash Loungani, “Measuring Energy Security: Trends in the 
Diversification of Oil and Natural Gas Supplies,” Working Paper WP/11/39 (International Monetary Fund, 
2011), 3, http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/internationalmf.pdf. 
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multiple indigenous energy sources to enhance domestic energy security.24 Energy 
independence in today’s energy market is not to become entirely energy self-sufficient. 
The goal is to reduce the country’s vulnerability to import dependence.25 
This thesis addresses how Tanzania and Mozambique’s governments are reacting 
to recent natural gas discoveries and their country’s energy insecurity. Decisions about 
how to use newly discovered gas resources relate to theories of distributive politics, 
political-economic growth strategies, and international trade. This section reviews these 
three approaches to understand how they may (or may not) explain recent discoveries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, such as in Tanzania and Mozambique.26 
2. Political Dynamics and Resource Distribution 
To understand why a government selects an energy strategy, one must break 
down the components that influence the decision-making process. One of the key aspects 
of strategy choice is the politics of distribution within the government. The literature on 
distributive politics is extensive, so the following sections will highlight the aspects that 
are expected to be present in Tanzania and Mozambique.  
Since single parties dominate the multiparty systems in Tanzania and 
Mozambique, one expects political parties will, at least to some extent, use energy 
resources as political leverage to stay in power. Competition between political elites over 
the access to energy resources has the potential to direct the distribution and development 
agendas of the central government. While the majority of the literature focuses on the 
reasons political parties distribute resources in hegemonic and multiparty systems, the 
focus of this thesis will be on how political elite competition over access to resources 
influences the choice of energy strategy. 
                                                 
24 Saburo Okita, “Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 52, 
no. 4 (July 1974): 723, doi: 10.2307/20038083. 
25 David L. Greene, “Measuring Energy Security: Can the United States Achieve Oil Independence?” 
Energy Policy 38, no. 4 (April 2010): 1620, doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2009.01.041. 
26 Kruyt et al., “Indicators for Energy Security,” 2167. 
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The literature on hegemonic and multiparty systems presents similar results on the 
different ways and reasons political parties distribute resources. Much of the research 
focuses on political parties establishing and maintaining political support in exchange for 
resources, such as electricity.27 Within governments with one dominant party, the goal is 
to consolidate power and policy influence by catering to long-time party supporters.28 By 
setting up political patronage systems, dominant party representatives benefit from the 
informal networks by staying in political office and by gaining access to resources.29 The 
ability to influence strategy choice comes with maximizing positions in the decision-
making process.30 One expects that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with dominant 
parties will seek to use access to resources as a way to stay in power, for example by 
distributing electricity or energy-related profit to the constituencies on which the 
maintenance of power depends. 
In addition to the competition among parties, a factor that can have an impact on 
strategy choice is the presence of programmatic elites in the decision-making process. 
Jose Jaime Macuane defined programmatic elites as “a group of actors with direct access 
to policy-making positions that is self-consciously structured around a common 
commitment to a concrete and coherent programmatic model for a given policy sector.”31 
The assumption going into this study is that the influence (or lack of) by technocrats and 
programmatic elites establish energy development policies that do not specifically reward 
or exclude districts based on political party loyalty. The growing area of study expands 
the view of distributive politics beyond political party competition and looks at the 
influence of programmatic elites or technocrats in influencing distributive policies. 
                                                 
27 Marcelin Joanis, “The Road to Power: Partisan Loyalty and the Centralized Provision of Local 
Infrastructure,” Public Choice 146, no. 1 (January 2011): 117, doi 10.1007/s11127-009-0586-9. 
28 Laura Weinstein, “The Politics of Government Expenditures in Tanzania, 1999–2007,” African 
Studies Review 54 no. 1 (April 2011): 34, JSTOR (41304750); S. Erdem Aytaç, “Distributive Politics in a 
Multiparty System: The Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Turkey,” Comparative Political Studies 47 
no. 9 (2014): 1212, doi: 10.1177/0010414013495357.  
29 Van de Walle, African Economies, 54.  
30 Aytaç, “Distributive Politics,” 1212.  
31 Jose Jaime Macuane, “Economic and Political Liberalization, Dependency, and Elite Formation in 
Contemporary Mozambique,” Working Paper 2012:09 (Danish Institute for International Studies, 2012), 
31, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/21409/uploads. 
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Scholars analyze the prominence of technocrats or political coalitions in decision-making 
positions and the distribution of resources based on development strategies. Research 
indicates that governments with programmatic elites can decide to distribute resources to 
regions regardless of party loyalty to promote stability.32 Governments that are 
influenced by programmatic coalitions tend to incorporate public preferences in the 
policy formation process more than multiparty systems because programmatic coalitions 
prioritize sector development rather than just political survival.33 Programmatic 
distribution is not without political biases, though. Programmatic elites still have to 
maintain political support, and patronage embedded in development projects is 
common.34  
Resource endowments pose new avenues for political competition over control of 
resources. Tanzania and Mozambique have held several rounds of multiparty elections, 
but both countries experience political dominance by a single party. This thesis will look 
at the distributive trends of the government and the presence of programmatic elites 
influencing policy formation. The cohesiveness of decision makers is expected to have a 
significant impact on how a government chooses to develop the country’s energy sector. 
3. Economic Development Strategies 
Strategies for developing energy sectors are an important aspect of economic 
growth strategies. Choosing an inward focused or export-led strategy is the first step in 
the process, and many internal and external factors influence the decision-making process 
within developing countries. For developing countries with abundant resources, 
economic ideology is one factor affecting a government’s strategy choice for developing 
the country’s energy sector.35 Extensive research exists explaining why countries choose 
                                                 
32 Yusaku Horiuchi and Seungjoo Lee, “The Presidency, Regionalism, and Distributive Politics in 
South Korea,” Comparitive Political Studies 41, no. 6 (2008): 863, doi 10.1177/0010414006298900.  
33 Miriam Golden and Brian Min, “Distributive Politics Around the World,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 16, no. 1 (2013): 74, doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-052209-121553. 
34 Ibid., 77. 
35 Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990), 28. 
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inward or export-oriented economic strategies. Very little research is published 
correlating national economic strategies with sub-sector development strategies.  
A county’s economic strategy provides a framework for how governments decide 
to develop the energy sector. The consensus among academics is that resource-based 
development goals tend to prioritize either export or domestic use of natural resources.36 
According to the research, both strategies are dependent on external investment and 
technology. Developing countries actively pursue investment and technology necessary 
for energy sector development, and recent studies indicate that developing countries are 
creating policies in competition for foreign direct investment (FDI).37 The goal of 
governments is to be more attractive to private and foreign investment than other energy 
producing countries.38 The choice of energy sector development strategy is related to the 
national economic strategy.  
One expects that a successful energy strategy will reflect the objectives of the 
economic strategy. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank structural 
adjustment programs in the 1990s recommended economic reforms to liberalize 
economic sectors and establish “market-based institutions.”39 Developing countries 
attempting to transition to market-oriented economies are expected to implement reforms 
that remove or reduce government involvement in economic sectors.40 The assumption is 
that the government would enable local, private investment in the energy sector. What the 
literature in economic strategy is clear on is what countries should implement to develop 
the national economy. The studies indicated that governments needed to decentralize the 
                                                 
36 Michael Roemer, “Resource-Based Industrialization in Developing Countries: A Survey,” Journal 
of Development Economics 6 no. 2 (1979): 163, doi: 10.1016/0304-3878(79)90012-9.  
37 Roemer, “Resource-Based Industrialization,” 166; Rajneesh Narula and John H. Dunning, 
“Industrial Development, Globalization and Multinational Enterprises: New Realities for Developing 
Countries,” Oxford Development Studies 28 no. 2 (2000): 142, doi:10.1080/713688313. 
38 Narula and Dunning, “Industrial Development,” 142. 
39 Jakob De Haan, Susanna Lundstrom, and Jan-Egbert Sturm, “Market-Oriented Institutions and 
Policies and Economic Growth: A Critical Survey,” Journal of Economic Surveys 20, no. 2 (2006): 157–8, 
Doi: 10.1111/j.0950-0804.2006.00278.x. 
40 Ibid., 158. 
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control of the economy, promote privatization, and allow market signals to direct 
growth.41  
In recent research, some scholars present data that supports selective state 
interference in sub-sectors. Wanting to protect an underdeveloped energy sector from the 
exploitation of private enterprises is expected, especially in developing countries where 
governments have a legacy of tight state control of all aspects of the economy.42 In some 
studies, scholars presented structured economic policies as an import substitution phase 
necessary to progress to export-led growth. Adopting a market-oriented strategy leads to 
the expectation that countries committed to liberalization would carry over the conditions 
to sub-sectors, such as the energy sector.43 
This thesis will analyze how the economic policies affect the development of the 
energy sector with the expectation that the national economic development strategy will 
correlate to energy sector development. The focus area of the research will look at how 
each country’s government approaches privatization of the energy sector and how 
economic linkages influence the direction of domestic energy sector development. 
4. International Relationships 
With the recent discoveries, Sub-Saharan countries are experiencing increased 
interest from international actors. How governments react and interact with these actors is 
expected to have a significant effect on energy strategy choice, because the agendas of 
international partners strongly influence developing country governments. International 
partners often have privileged access to decision makers, and in return for assistance or 
investment, partners tend to implement concessions that direct the policy decisions of 
host governments. In many cases, pressure from external actors provides governments 
with incentives to align energy policies with the agendas of the external actors and makes 
                                                 
41 World Bank, World Development Report 1987 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), 92, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5970; Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke, 
“Participatory and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 2 (April 
2000): 250, JSTOR (3993419).  
42 Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery, 24–25. 
43 Ibid., 42. 
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governments less responsive to the demands of the population. The literature in this area 
focuses on the various ways external actors partner with resource-rich countries.  
With increased interest, resource-rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are now 
faced with managing domestic and foreign energy resource demand.44 A consensus 
within the policy community indicates regional and international partnerships are 
necessary for energy sector development because of the high up-front costs for energy 
infrastructure and imported technology. There are differing views on how much 
involvement international actors should have in a country’s policy development process.  
One area of research argues that international organizations (IGOs) should 
provide the standards and guidance of energy policies. Technical assistance is necessary 
because most developing countries do not have experience in managing energy sectors. 
The current trend of Western states is to promote private investment and improved 
investment climates in developing countries. Studies show that the legacy of international 
aid and the current trend of assistance are influencing governments to focus on domestic 
capacity to ensure the long-term development of the energy sector.45  
The literature also shows there is a push to promote energy sector reforms to 
include promoting stronger negotiating positions for developing countries.46 Building 
energy sector management capabilities are expected to encourage governments to focus 
on domestic energy security while preventing the unbalanced exploitation of resources by 
international actors.47 International organizations and regional energy partnerships in 
these cases have a weighted influence in a government’s choice of energy strategy.48  
                                                 
44 Giorgio Gualberti, Morgan Brazilian, and Todd Moss, “Energy Investments in Africa by the U.S., 
Europe and China,” International Association for Energy Economics (2014): 34, http://www.iaee.org/en/ 
publications/fullnewsletter.aspx?id=30. 
45 Gualberti, Brazilian and Moss, “Energy Investments in Africa,” 31. 
46 Leon Fuerth, “Energy, Homeland, and National Security,” in Energy and Security: Toward a New 
Foreign Policy Strategy, ed. Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 
2005), 412–13.  
47 Adam B. Jaffe and Robert N. Stavins, “The Energy-Efficiency Gap: What Does It Mean?” Energy 
Policy 22, no. 10 (October 1994): 808, doi: 10.1016/0301-4215(94)90138-4.  
48 Charles Roxburgh et al., Lions on the Move: The Progess and Potential of African Economies (N.P.: 
McKinsey Global Institute, June 2010), 8; Africa Progress Panel, Power People Planet, 104.  
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Other academics present the case that strong foreign interest often encourages 
developing countries to prioritize exporting energy resources. Global energy consumers 
use direct investment to gain preferential access to resources.49 In Sub-Saharan Africa 
where most countries run energy deficits, there is a growing demand for resource-rich 
countries to supply the region. Regional power pools guide countries to export energy 
with the expectation that the partnership will be a more efficient means to enhance energy 
security.50 The political influence of powerful neighbors and regional partnerships is 
expected to influence a government’s energy strategy toward export.  
This thesis will analyze the influence international actors have had in the decision 
making and policy development process of developing countries. Since both Tanzania 
and Mozambique have only recently begun to expand their energy production, the 
influence of international actors is likely to be a key factor in the choice of energy 
strategy. 
C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS 
The major issue addressed by this thesis is why countries pursue energy strategies 
that focus on domestic consumption of energy resources instead of export. Building on 
the three areas of literature described in the previous section, the thesis advances three 
hypotheses to explain why a resource-rich country would choose to prioritize domestic 
energy supply instead of exporting energy resources. The first hypothesis is that 
governments with a cohesive group of elites willing to share access to energy resources 
will lead governments to prioritize domestic energy supply. The second hypothesis 
predicts that energy sector privatization reforms that are aligned with the macroeconomic 
strategy will enable governments to enhance domestic energy security through consistent 
                                                 
49 Peng Claire Bai, “The Ambivalent Nexus: The Rise of China, National Oil Companies, and Energy 
Security in Africa,” in Crossroads Africa: Perspectives on U.S.-China-Africa Security Affairs, ed. Robert 
Tomes, Angela Sapp Mancini, and James T. Kirkhope (New York: Council for Emerging National Security 
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50 World Bank, Building Regional Power Pools: A Toolkit (Washington, DC: Energy, Transport, and 
Water Department, World Bank Group, 2008), 3, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/06/ 
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energy policies and mutually beneficial international partnerships. The third hypothesis is 
that policy influence from external actors will affect a government’s choice of energy 
strategy. If the political dynamics within the government are cohesive then the 
international relationships will support the development of the domestic energy sector. If 
the political dynamics are fractured with then international relationships are expected to 
support export-led development of the energy sector.  
All of the hypotheses have important implications for developing energy 
producers and their partners. Recent discoveries of natural resources in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the increased prioritization of energy security throughout the world is pushing 
Tanzania and Mozambique to the front of the increasingly interconnected global energy 
market. If the first hypothesis is correct, political elites need to be willing to cede control 
of access to resources and distribution. If the second hypothesis is correct, developing 
countries with abundant energy resources need to use the economic framework as a 
model for domestic energy sector development. If the third hypothesis is correct, 
governments need to establish consistent policies to ensure partnerships are mutually 
beneficial and aligned with national interests. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The research design will include a comparative case study of Tanzania and 
Mozambique. The comparison will focus on the political dynamics of decision makers, 
national economic strategies, and international relationships to isolate key differences 
that explain a government’s choice of energy strategy. The countries were chosen based 
on a number of underlying similarities. Both countries experienced significant natural gas 
discoveries at the same time and had similar political and economic foundations prior to 
the discoveries. In both cases, the governments are also faced with the same energy sector 
challenges. Given the similarities and each country’s underdeveloped energy sectors, 
both governments have the opportunity to choose a domestic supply or export-led energy 
strategy.  
The analysis will draw from a variety of sources. A majority of the research will 
rely on scholarly journals, government reports, and international statistics collection 
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agencies. This thesis will also include information collected in government and interest 
group working papers that analyze the current energy situation in Tanzania and 
Mozambique. Press releases and news reports will provide additional insight into the 
factors influencing strategy choice.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will analyze how the governments of Tanzania and Mozambique are 
reacting to recent energy resource discoveries. With access to significant amounts of 
energy resources, decision makers are faced with enhancing domestic supply or 
developing export capabilities. To provide an explanation of why a developing country 
would choose a domestic supply strategy, the factors influencing decision makers needs 
to be analyzed.  
The thesis is organized into four chapters using a case study and comparative 
analysis format. Following the introductory chapter, the Chapter II presents the political 
dynamics, economic strategy, and international relations of Tanzania. Chapter III consists 
of the Mozambique case study that will address the same factors as the Tanzania case 
study. The conclusion chapter provides a comparative analysis of the Tanzania and 
Mozambique case studies as well as implications for energy sector development 
strategies for developing countries. 
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Tanzania experienced a paradigm shift in how the government addressed the 
country’s energy insecurity. Recently discovered reserves of natural gas provided 
Tanzania with an opportunity to secure its supply of energy from domestic sources before 
it profited from the export of natural gas. The Government of Tanzania (GoT) has chosen 
to enact a series of internally directed energy sector policies that provide clearly defined 
goals to enhance domestic energy security.51 Simultaneously, the economy has shifted 
toward a market-oriented strategy. Tanzania’s inward-focused strategy, in contrast to 
Mozambique’s export-oriented strategy, prioritized the use of its natural resources for 
domestic energy supply rather than export. This chapter argues that the development of 
energy resources for domestic use in Tanzania was a result of the cohesiveness of 
programmatic elites, the liberalization of the country’s economy, and the external 
relationships with Western partner nations and international organizations. The first 
section of this chapter will address the political context of the development of the energy 
sector and the agents involved in setting policy and distributing resources. The second 
section will focus on the aspects of Tanzania’s economic trajectory that favors private 
investment and a limited interventionist role of the central government. The third section 
presents the external relations that fostered an inward focused development strategy. 
B. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF ENERGY SECTOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
Tanzania’s energy sector has been stagnant for most of the country’s history. 
Socialist policies adopted at independence did little to enhance or maintain the existing 
infrastructure. Like most countries, in Tanzania electricity and energy resources are 
public services the government is expected to provide. The economic crisis spanning the 
1980s and 1990s led to international economic intervention, which began a paradigm 
                                                 
51 Jonas Ewald, Challenges for the Democratisation Process in Tanzania: Moving Towards 
Consolidation 50 Years After Independence? (Tanzania: Mkuki na Nyota, 2011), 397. 
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shift in Tanzania’s approach to its energy insecurity.52 The economic liberalization 
process, which the next section will discuss in more detail, turned the distribution of 
energy from public service to a market commodity. 
In 2004, large reserves of natural gas were discovered in Tanzania. By then the 
political and economic trajectory of Tanzania had shifted. The government remained 
single-party-dominated but had growing participation by opposition parties. Within the 
national government, the party elites had also shifted from primarily party loyalists to 
elites motivated to promote a unified developmental program.53 The energy sector 
development plans devised required the decision makers to maintain an inward focus. 
A significant point that led the Government of Tanzania to choose domestic 
energy development over export was the prominence of technocratic and programmatic 
elites in decision-making positions. According to Stephen Haggard, the dimension of the 
state structure was a key factor in how governments chose a development strategy.54 In 
Tanzania, the political elites experienced a general cohesiveness of decision makers that 
enabled them to establish consistent policies that were accepted by the public.55 In 
comparison, technocrats have been removed from political positions in Mozambique.56 
Even though there are signs of biased distribution of certain goods and services in 
Tanzania, the equal distribution of energy appears to cross party loyalty lines.  
Political competition for the access to energy resources has been limited since the 
first natural gas discovery in 1974. Since 1962, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has 
been the dominant ruling party, and the country has experienced relative political 
stability.57 After independence, Tanzania was a single-party state with the African 
                                                 
52 Rebecca Ghanadan, “Connected Geographies and Struggles over Access: Electricity 
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53 Robert Pinkney, Democracy and Dictatorship in Ghana and Tanzania (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1997), 117, doi: 10.1057/9780230379589. 
54 Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery, 43. 
55 Ibid., 45. 
56 Weinstein, “Politics of Government Expenditures,” 54. 
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 19
National Unity (TANU) as the ruling party. TANU became the Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
party (CCM) in 1977 under the unifying effort of President Julius Nyerere. Fearing the 
fractionalization of the party after independence, President Nyerere promoted socialist 
principles that focused the government’s attention on providing resources to the 
population.58 The socialist policies ensured party cohesion and set the framework for an 
inward-focused energy development strategy. 
One reason that distribution of energy resources crosses party lines in Tanzania is 
the CCM’s historically dominant position and its willingness to share access to energy 
resources. The dominance of the CCM has established a relatively cohesive group of 
elites that face limited challenges to their policy choices. The Civic United Front (CUF) 
is the primary opposition party, but its power base is located in the semi-autonomous 
archipelago of Zanzibar.59 Only recently with the significant discoveries of deep-water 
natural gas reserves has competition for control of natural gas occurred.60 Since Zanzibar 
is reliant on mainland Tanzania for energy resources, the CCM has quieted tensions 
through the distribution of electricity and restructuring of the Natural Gas Production 
Sharing Agreement (PSA).61  
Keeping with Haggard’s explanation of development strategies, the GoT 
exhibited a consensus on the energy sector development strategy. The cohesiveness of the 
state elite in the decision-making process was a critical factor in the choice to use the 
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country’s energy resources for domestic purposes.62 In comparison, Mozambique’s 
central government was (and still is) highly fractionalized, which produced inconsistent, 
ambiguous policies.63 A key aspect in the cohesion was the lack of difference in ideology 
or policy preference between the CCM and the opposition parties.64 While Tanzania was 
not without internal political conflicts, the decision-making process was concentrated at 
the national level. The top-down decision-making was similar to both Mozambique and 
the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs).65 The ability of the elites to push 
interests without strong social pressure allowed the government to integrate further the 
inward focused energy sector development strategy into the greater national development 
vision. 
A common policy failure within developing countries comes with policies that 
incorporate agendas of multiple ministries. Tanzania’s Ministry of Energy and Minerals 
(MEM) provided a unified platform for both the natural gas and electricity sub-sectors. 
The significance of having both sub-sectors managed by one ministry was that there were 
limited opportunities for other cabinet ministers to coordinate or counter the strategy to 
use natural gas for domestic energy.66 The completion of six gas-fired generation projects 
and seven transmission expansion projects was evidence of the acceptance of the strategy 
to transition from hydropower to gas-fired power generation.67  
The new direction of energy distribution has earned increased public support for 
the CCM and its inward focused strategy. Previous studies indicated that the CCM 
enhanced its political support by increasing budget allocations to loyal CCM districts and 
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reducing allocations to districts that favored opposition parties.68 Districts like Mtwara 
and Mbeya experienced the fastest energy development, and they were not CCM 
strongholds.69 Overall, the GoT has maintained its support for the development strategy 
by doubling the country’s electricity access.70  
Tanzania’s domestic energy sector development has benefited from the political 
reforms and the evolution of the decision makers. While the relative unity of political 
elites helped create an inwardly focused, coherent energy strategy that has increased 
domestic energy production and distribution, this strategy in turn helped to support the 
political hegemony of the CCM and political elites. The Government of Tanzania has 
changed its ideological views from socialist to more liberal while it maintained an 
interest in providing public goods and political cohesion. Led by programmatic elites, the 
GoT has established a consistent set of energy sector policies that have included multiple 
ministries. In the meantime, the population benefited from increased distribution of 
electricity through a diversification of energy sources. 
C. ECONOMIC STRATEGY 
The dominance of the CCM and the cohesiveness of the decision makers do not 
fully explain why the GoT prioritized its domestic energy sector rather than exporting the 
natural resources for commercial purposes. The orientation of Tanzania’s development 
strategy was shaped by the political cohesiveness, which aligned with the interests of its 
international partners. External relationships will be further discussed in the next section. 
Decision making was reserved for the central government, but the state downsized its role 
in the economy. Unlike Mozambique, the GoT’s decentralized role in the energy sector 
                                                 
68 Weinstein, “Politics of Government Expenditures,” 52.  
69 Ibid., 54. 
70 United Republic of Tanzania, Basic Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile Report Tanzania 
Mainland (Tanzania: National Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance, and Office of Chief Government 
Statistician, 2014), vii, xii, http://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov_uploads/documents/TANZANIA_ 
MAINLAND_SOCIO_ECONOMIC_PROFILE_sw.pdf; “More Than Clouds over the Southern Highlands 
of Tanzania,” African Electric Territorialities, November 28, 2014, 
https://electricterritorialities.wordpress.com/tag/tanzania/. Embedded video information used appears at 
0:17. 
 22
has limited its direct ownership of energy enterprises, which allowed the government to 
focus on sector management. The selective involvement in the energy sector was 
designed to optimize market competition in the “generation, transmission, and 
distribution” of energy and encourage the development of the domestic market.71 The 
market orientation of the country’s economy fostered a stronger influence of local small- 
and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in the energy sector. In comparison, Mozambique 
has focused on exporting its natural gas now, and plans to develop the domestic energy 
sector later. Also, the Government of Mozambique (GoM) presented a development 
strategy that favored mega projects and large foreign investors over local entrepreneurs.  
Tanzania’s inward focused strategy has clearly defined programmatic objectives. 
To reach the energy goals the government has adopted a market-oriented economic 
strategy. Lessons learned from developed countries indicate that an inward focus and 
selective state protection policies prior to transitioning to an export-led strategy initially 
favors the domestic market.72 With a long history of import substitution, there are elites 
in the government that maintained the protectionist strategy in the energy sector.73 The 
elites promoting more protectionist development strategies are the base of the 
programmatic elite in Tanzania. The group has linked the energy strategy with the 
objectives of the national development strategy to create coherent and consistent policies. 
The government’s national strategy documents, The Big Results Now initiative and the 
Vision 2025, established the framework of how the government intends to address the 
natural gas windfall and domestic energy insecurity.74  
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The volatility of the natural gas market also concerned the GoT. Tanzania did not 
have to look far to see the negative effects of price shocks of natural resources. By 
developing the country’s domestic energy sector before exporting, the government 
protected itself from price shocks in the volatile natural gas market. The local 
entrepreneurs that gained access to cheap energy allows the country to insulated itself 
from international energy supply fluctuations.75  
Market-oriented strategies combined with aspects of state intervention have been 
successful in some NICs. Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea all had success with limited state 
protective measures in a market-oriented economy.76 Similar to China, the GoT played 
an active yet limited role in the economy to facilitate competition and maximize 
opportunities for the domestic energy market.77 The main mechanisms that bolstered 
domestic enterprises and the domestic energy sector were the natural gas PSAs and the 
recently passed Local Content Policy (LCP) for Natural Gas. The PSAs were signed 
contracts that create joint ventures between international oil companies and the Tanzania 
Petroleum Development Company (TPDC). Additionally, PSAs ensured local energy 
enterprises received at least a minimum of produced resources to meet domestic energy 
demand.78 The PSAs and the LCP not only ensured that the government could diversify 
its domestic energy supply but also it improved opportunities for mid- and down-stream 
local enterprises.79  
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Unlike Mozambique, the GoT has taken a decentralized, strategic role in the 
energy sector rather than direct control. By decentralizing, the government has limited its 
monopoly ownership of enterprises in the natural gas and electricity subsectors. The 
privatization strengthened local stakeholders and allowed the GoT to focus on sector 
management.80 The GoM faced the same challenge, but the Mozambique Liberation 
Front’s (FRELIMO’s) priority decided to collect revenue from natural gas and electricity 
exports to maintain political power over the Mozambican National Resistance 
(RENAMO).  
The aggressive privatization strategy in Tanzania has created new business 
opportunities for local investors. The country’s economic strategy has led to the 
privatization of over 300 state-owned enterprises through private sales, joint ventures, 
and public shareholding options.81 Prioritizing of the domestic market has also enabled 
more local entrepreneurs to secure financing. Both The Bank of Tanzania and the rapidly 
expanding commercial banking sector in Tanzania have increased the lending rates for 
long-term loans.82 As a result, the domestic energy sector has experienced an increase in 
local SME investment in community energy projects. 
Restructuring the electricity sub-sector has been a key to the privatization of the 
energy sector. Recommendations from international technical advisors led to the GoT 
unbundling its state utility, TANESCO, and its national oil company, TPDC. The 
restructuring of TANESCO consisted of separating the “vertically integrated” utility into 
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separate entities to provide services from power generation to distribution.83 The state 
continues to own the generation company, and it is now a publicly traded corporation 
allowing up to 49% of the company to be sold to public shareholders. Private investors 
compete to provide transmission and distribution services.84 The unbundling of TPDC 
followed a standard model of upstream regulation, similar to the model used by Norway, 
which promoted a “three-way separation of powers” between the GoT, TPDC, and the 
national oil company.85 TPDC remains the sub-sector upstream regulator, while the 
national oil company competes in the natural gas sub-sector and advises the Ministry of 
Energy and Minerals on the current natural gas production levels and “policy issues.”86  
The GoT viewed the restructuring as a way to attract local investors that have a 
personal interest in providing improved service since electricity transmission and 
distribution projects were not attractive to foreign private investors. Recent legislation 
established the Regional Energy Agency (REA) and the Electricity and Water Utilities 
Regulatory Agency (EWURA), which support and monitor independent power producers 
(IPPs). In general, IPPs were designed to reduce the financial burden of state utilities to 
construct new power projects, provide additional energy supply to meet domestic 
demand, and lower energy prices for consumers.87 The consistent budget allocation to 
REA ensured small IPPs had the financial support to start-up operations and fair access to 
domestic energy sources. With the support given to small IPPs, Tanzania has witnessed 
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in increase in community micro-grids and use of solar photo voltaic systems that have the 
ability to be connected to the national grid.88  
The increased number of IPPs providing off-grid electricity has allowed the 
government to attract foreign investors to complement the domestic priorities. Through 
improved access to reliable energy, the GoT has promoted a less risky investment 
climate. As a result, the improved business environment has led to an increased 
confidence and willingness of international actors to negotiate mutually beneficial 
contracts with the GoT. The combination of the political elite wanting to expand the 
domestic energy market and international oil companies being attracted to the abundance 
of natural gas reserves allowed the GoT to develop policies and legislation that balance 
domestic interests with investment attractiveness.89 Foreign inflows are essential for the 
construction of necessary energy infrastructure and improved extraction technology.90 By 
partnering with international oil companies (IOCs) the GoT has been able to increase 
public spending on switching from hydro power generation to primarily a natural gas-
fired power supply.91  
Tanzania’s economic strategy fits into the first stage of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI). The core policies within this stage were designed to establish free 
trade and attract foreign investment while protecting and financially supporting local 
entrepreneurs.92 There was clear evidence that the liberalization of the economy has 
improved Tanzania’s investment climate. The discovery of large reserves of natural gas 
has led to an extractive sector dominated by IOCs and the TPDC. Despite the investment 
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of foreign industry and external actors, the GoT has been able to implement policies that 
have benefited the domestic energy market and local entrepreneurs.93 In contrast 
Mozambique attempted to skip to export-led energy sector development that favors a 
small group of elites and large, foreign investors.94  
A combination of politically cohesive decisions and an aggressive economic 
liberalization enabled the GoT prioritize the development of its domestic energy sector.95 
With the quantities of energy resources available for exploitation, foreign extractive 
industries will continue to vie for contracts with Tanzania despite its selective state 
intervention to ensure domestic demand is met.96 Until the comparative advantage shifts 
from agriculture to natural gas the GoT appears to be waiting for the right signals to 
transition to energy export-led growth.97 
D. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Tanzania’s international partnerships have shaped the trajectory of the country’s 
energy strategy. A significant area of divergence between Tanzania and Mozambique 
occurred with the nature of international relationships in the energy sector. In Tanzania, 
the government has become more involved with Western international financial 
institutions and it has not been pressured by neighboring countries to export energy. 
Whereas in Mozambique, the pressure from external actors to export energy and partner 
with large private investors have led to the export-oriented energy strategy. This section 
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will discuss various international partnerships with the GoT and the impacts on the 
domestic energy sector.  
Immediately following independence, Tanzania adopted socialist economic 
policies and focused on internal development of the economy.98 In the late 1990s, the 
economic views of the elite shifted and the GoT began to align with Western partners and 
IFIs.99 Tanzania’s recent natural gas discoveries have led to an increased interest in the 
country’s energy resources, but the relationships established with the international 
community have allowed Tanzania to maintain an inward focus while developing the 
domestic energy sector. 
The international system is a critical factor in a country’s choice of development 
strategy.100 After the resignation of President Julius Nyerere, Tanzania has tended to 
align with Western partners and international organizations.101 The GoT’s responsiveness 
to externally imposed reforms in trade for financial aid assisted in shifting the isolated 
state toward its current market-oriented stance.102 The ownership that Tanzania took in 
continuing the reforms has raised the international community’s confidence in doing 
business in Tanzania. Since the discovery of natural gas, the international community has 
expanded the scope of technical assistance to Tanzania because of the country’s increased 
capacity to generate revenue from energy resources. The current trend is to assist 
Tanzania with enhancing its domestic energy supply and pushing public-private 
partnerships. For Tanzania, the push for public-private partnerships (PPPs) aligned with 
its domestic priorities to promote local energy enterprises and the domestic use of the 
country’s energy resources. 
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The partnerships within the international system allowed the GoT to continue to 
pursue an inward focused energy sector development strategy. The international 
partnerships that the elite pursued provide the GoT with measures of performance 
legitimacy and necessary technical assistance to manage the emerging energy sector. The 
alliances and global initiatives coincided with the domestic priorities to enhance domestic 
energy security and transition from hydro power dependent to a more reliable gas-fired 
power system. Misalignment of policy priorities is often a development impediment of 
developing countries because global energy consumers and IOCs often take advantage of 
the exploitive nature of inexperienced governments attempting to manage an abundant 
natural resource sector.103 
Tanzania, much like Mozambique, experienced significant influence and pressure 
from external actors but have observed very different results from the partnerships. Both 
countries have been “donor darlings” since the 1990s.104 During this time, 
recommendations from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) led the 
country to liberalize its economy. Today, the liberalization has allowed the political elite 
to implement reforms that favor domestic entrepreneurs and stakeholders in public 
enterprises105 The political elite continue to foster close ties to foreign donors either for 
technical assistance or financial aid.106 Since the discovery of large natural gas reserves, 
official development assistance (ODA) in relation to gross domestic product (GDP) has 
declined, which gave the GoT greater autonomy to focus on domestic priorities.107 The 
government’s autonomy increased because of the reduction of policy requirements that 
international partners attach to ODA, which allowed decision makers to choose partners 
that complemented the government’s agenda.  
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Through the external relationships, the GoT has improved its energy sector 
management capabilities through international monitoring assistance. The international 
community routinely criticized the government of Tanzania for the perception of rampant 
corruption, and by pursuing and meeting international requirements it was a sign that the 
sustainable development of its energy sector was a priority of the GoT. The outsourcing 
of monitoring and enforcement of the accountability mechanism to the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the International Energy Charter (IEC) 
improved the government’s accountability to the public because of the improved 
transparency and management of the energy sector.108  
The standards required of compliance to the EITI and the IEC also promoted a 
balanced energy sector development strategy. The improved reporting and transparency 
to the public made the elites more accountable and more responsive to the population. 
The EITI process established mutual accountability of private industry and the 
government, which promoted government legitimacy within the international community 
and with the local population.109 According to the IEC, “the Energy Charter is an 
international organization that promotes the rule of law and regulatory stability for 
investment, trade, transit and efficiency in the energy sector across the world.”110 
Through the guidance of the International Community, the GoT has created the National 
Regulatory Agency and the Tanzania EITI (TEITI). Compliance with EITI provided 
measures for broad based performance legitimacy, which enabled Tanzania to pursue its 
inward energy sector development strategy. In Mozambique, the GoM’s export-oriented 
                                                 
108 Helen Tilley, The Political Economy of aid and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Budget 
Support in Tanzania (England: Ashgate, 2014), 93. 
109 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative Report on the TEITI Reconciliation for the Period 1st July 2008 to 30th June 2009 (England: Hart 
Group, BDO East Africa, 2011), 6, http://data.revenuewatch.org/eiti/country/tanzania/2009/16769.php. 
110 Energy Charter Secretariat, Pre-Assessment Report of the Tanzania Energy Sector under the 
Principles of the International Energy Charter and the Energy Charter Treaty (Brussels: Energy Charter 
Secretariat, 2015), 6, http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CONEXO/20150827-
Tanzania_Pre-Assessment_Report.pdf. 
 31
strategy gained legitimacy with Mozambique’s export partners through compliance with 
EITI reporting standards.111  
Tanzania is not yet the target of global energy importers because the natural gas 
sub-sector is still in development. The GoT has used the influence of the United States to 
format policies to improve energy sector management while it directed Chinese 
investment toward infrastructure projects. China is very active in energy sector 
development in Tanzania, with the intention to export natural gas as soon as possible.112 
In the meantime, the Chinese infrastructure investment projects have complemented the 
technical assistance strategies of IGOs and the United States.113 The elites have been able 
to channel the varying interests from international actors toward enhancing domestic 
energy security.  
The GoT’s partnership with the United States was based on domestic energy 
sector development and technical assistance. The reputation and development status of 
Tanzania led to its inclusion in the Power Africa Initiative specifically designed to 
enhance Tanzania’s energy sector. The Power Africa Initiative is a six country 
partnership with the United States aimed at promoting sustainable energy development. 
Tanzania is one of the six African countries partnered with private sector actors to 
enhance energy security by harnessing domestic energy resources.114 The technical 
advice from private sector investment has complemented the capacity building of key 
institutions.115 The energy sector managers have learned to implement feed-in tariffs and 
improve power purchase agreements for renewable energy projects, which has helped 
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diversify the domestic energy supply and increase affordable access to electricity to more 
of the population.116 The Power Africa Initiative coincides with Tanzania’s economic 
strategy and electrification goals.  
The Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact has reinforced the GoT’s 
inward energy focus. Tanzania signed a Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact in 
2008 that focused on the energy, transport, and water sectors. The $698M U.S. compact 
targeted weaknesses in the existing infrastructure. From 2008 to 2013, the USG, GoT, 
and 10 U.S. companies partnered to build and update power generation facilities and 
transmission lines and completed a submarine transmission line from mainland Tanzania 
to Zanzibar.117 The grid extension projects allowed increased connection rates to 
households, businesses, and industry consumers. Upon the successful completion of the 
MCC Compact, the long-term impacts from the partnership are expected to be significant. 
Specifically, the enhanced power capacity and transmission lines are expected to make 
electricity distribution more reliable and efficient.  
Both Tanzania and Mozambique were influenced by the international community. 
One of the biggest differences was the pressure exerted by neighboring countries. Where 
Mozambique experienced high demand from its SADC partners for energy, Tanzania was 
not pressured to export energy. Tanzania is currently still an electricity importer, so there 
is only limited regional coordination among its East African Community (EAC) partners. 
The lack of regional demand has allowed the GoT to establish development corridors 
oriented toward domestic development. The corridors were mapped near the perimeter of 
the country where most of the urban development is located and accessible to future 
regional linkages.118 A long-term goal for Tanzania is to become a regional natural gas 
supplier to further the EAC agenda to upgrade to modern energy sources in rural 
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communities.119 For the current time, Tanzania has maintained its development strategy 
course and will wait for the domestic energy market to develop before making poor 
investment decisions. 
Tanzania’s international partners and external relationships were not direct causes 
of the GoT’s choice of an inward energy sector development strategy. The relationships, 
however, reinforced the interests of the political elite and followed the economic strategy. 
Despite the necessity for foreign and private investment, the GoT sent a clear message 
that domestic energy was the priority.120 While requiring higher royalties and 
implementing local content policies may be a detractor for private, foreign investors, 
Tanzania can be assured the global demand for natural gas will continue to attract 
investors. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The enhanced energy security in Tanzania was a result of the government’s 
decision to utilize the country’s energy resources for domestic consumption. The 
complex explanation of why the GoT chose to develop the domestic energy sector instead 
of focusing on collecting export revenue includes a combination of factors; the first factor 
being the cohesiveness of decision makers. In Tanzania’s case, the consensus was to 
focus inward while Mozambique’s government chose to prioritize natural gas export. 
Another factor, which coincided with the consistency of the programmatic elites, was the 
economic strategy that promoted local energy sector entrepreneurs. Small and medium-
sized enterprises had access to financing and resources through protective policies in the 
market-oriented economy. Finally, the domestic policies focused on the domestic energy 
sector development were aligned with the country’s key partners. The external pressure 
to export is somewhat limited at the moment, which is allowing Tanzania to focus on 
internal distribution.  
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Like Tanzania, access to reliable electricity has always been a challenge in 
Mozambique. Today, Mozambique is being forced to the forefront of an emerging global 
energy market. Recent discoveries of natural gas are presenting the government and 
people of Mozambique with an opportunity to secure not only access to affordable energy 
but also an opportunity to increase GDP through the export of natural gas. Many of the 
current energy distribution issues are rooted in the political competition between 
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and Mozambique National Resistance 
(RENAMO) and the influence of strong external actors in the decision-making process. 
This chapter argues that Mozambique’s strategy to export natural gas over developing the 
country’s domestic energy sector was a result of the dominance of FRELIMO’s political 
elites, an economic strategy that favored foreign export enterprises, and the significant 
influence of South Africa in energy sector policy formation. In comparison, the GoT 
established an inward focused energy strategy because of a cohesive group of elites that 
prioritized domestic energy supply rather than the export of energy. Additionally, where 
Mozambique’s government was pressured to export energy by influential international 
entities, Tanzania’s government chose to partner with external actors that facilitated the 
development of the domestic energy sector. The following sections will address the 
historical and political context of energy resource development, Mozambique’s economic 
strategy that guided the energy sector, and the external relationships that affected the 
decisions of Mozambique’s policy makers. 
B. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF ENERGY SECTOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
Mozambique’s export-oriented energy sector has roots in pre-independence 
agreements between Portugal and South Africa. Since independence, the violent tensions 
between FRELIMO and RENAMO, which have continued after the civil war, have led to 
competition over access to energy resources. What has resulted is the use of energy as a 
political tool to consolidate the political power of FRELIMO. The financial benefits from 
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the export of energy and the ability to exclude opposition supporters have encouraged 
decision makers to follow an export-led strategy. 
The most recent discoveries of natural gas came during a renewed period of 
political tension between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The natural gas discoveries further 
entrenched the political competition through the elite fight over the ability to influence 
the decisions on how the country should utilize the resources. FRELIMO managed to 
restructure the party to consolidate its power around the new resources based on the 
growth potential from natural gas revenue.121 Tensions between the dominant parties 
lend to the strategy to export resources. In Mozambique FRELIMO’s control of the 
resources allowed the party elite to selectively exclude opposition supporters and retain 
personal benefits from their privileged access to energy resources.122  
Distribution of services as a reward for party loyalty is a common trend in 
Mozambique. The funding of domestic infrastructure and plans for energy distribution 
fall along political lines, and ultimately the distribution of services is a reward for 
political support. For regions supporting opposition parties, protests have often taken the 
form of avoiding electricity payment.123 At the national level, RENAMO and the 
Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) elites negotiated resource contracts outside 
official channels to gain access to resources and reduced FRELIMO’s monopoly control 
                                                 
121 Ichumile Gqada, A Boom for Whom? Mozambique’s Natural Gas and the New Development 
Opportunity, SAIIA Occasional Paper No. 151 (Johannesburg: South Africa Institute of International 
Affairs, 2013), 7, http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/a-boom-for-whom-mozambiques-natural-gas-
and-the-new-development-opportunity; Francesca Bruschi, “Mozambique at a Turning Point: From Aid 
Dependence to Development Effectiveness?” GREAT Insights 1, no. 10 (December 2012): 9, 
http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/GREAT-Insights-1-10-Africa-Turning-Point-Case-
Mozambique-2012.pdf.  
122 M. Anne Pitcher, Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa’s Democracies (Cambridge, NY: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012), 167–68; Lars Buur, “The Development of Natural Resource Linkages in 
Mozambique: The Ruling Elite Capture of New Economic Opportunities,” Working Paper 2014:03 (Danish 
Institute for International Studies, 2014), 4, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24539/uploads.  
123 Jocelyn Alexander, “The Local State in Post-War Mozambique: Political Practice and Ideas about 
Authority,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 67, no. 1 (1997): 12, ProQuest 
(213645777). 
 37
over the energy sector development.124 What has resulted through the competition is 
“partisan sector development.”125  
The cohesiveness of the state elite across political parties was a critical factor in 
shaping Tanzania’s energy development strategy, and the lack of cohesiveness in 
Mozambique was equally significant in the government’s choice to export energy.126 
Unlike the GoT, the GoM does not have a consensus between or among political parties 
on how to develop the energy sector. There was further dissent within FRELIMO on 
which development strategy to implement.127 Many of the party elites were (and still are) 
personally invested in energy projects or were stakeholders in extractive industries, which 
allowed the elites to form policies that served their personal interests without having to 
respond to social pressure.128  
Another factor that shaped Mozambique’s outward focused strategy was the 
influence of the executive in policy formation. In Tanzania the executive’s role in energy 
sector was limited to appointing the Minister of Energy and Minerals, and the president 
was also prohibited from allocating contracts since investment contracts are formally 
processed through the Tanzania Investment Center.129 Mozambique’s presidents have a 
legacy of direct personal intervention that affected the trajectory of the country’s 
development. Appointing cabinet members as a reward for political loyalty was also 
common. In the instance of President Guebuza, he replaced experienced technocrats that 
were moving toward experienced-based policy reform and reestablished the dominance 
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of political elites in the decision making and policy development process.130 The 
appointees were often long-time party loyalists with limited experience in energy sector 
management. The political appointees tend to pass legislation to protect the power of the 
executive and their link to the president’s favor.131 Family members and trusted advisors 
to previous presidents are still primary stakeholders in various sub-sectors associated 
with Mozambique’s energy sector development.132 
Political and social tensions in Mozambique undermined the development of the 
domestic energy sector. FRELIMO and decision makers focused on collecting revenue 
from foreign and private investors in the energy market. Increased FDI and private 
investment into Mozambique’s energy sector enabled the political elite to establish 
policies that favor energy export and distanced the government from civil society.133 
Without strong civil organizations to pressure the GoM to focus on domestic energy 
security, the decision makers will continue with the export-oriented strategy.134 The 
cross-cutting objectives of the political elite that is evident in Mozambique are indicative 
of a common cause for policy failure and why governments misuse resources.135 
C. ECONOMIC STRATEGY 
The Government of Mozambique prioritized the export of energy resources, and 
the export-led strategy was the outcome of the market-orientated reforms and the 
international energy market signals. In contrast to Tanzania, however, the domestic 
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energy sector of Mozambique has always been export-oriented. The abundance of energy 
resources located in Mozambique put the energy sector at the center of the development 
decisions.136 The GoM’s privatization process favored foreign investors over domestic 
energy sector entrepreneurs, which increased generation capacity but did not enhance 
domestic energy security. Foreign investors were attracted to the abundance of resources 
as well as the ability to gain influence in policy decisions through the direct negotiating 
with competing political elites.  
After economic crisis and a prolonged civil war that ended in 1992, Mozambique 
implemented policies to reform a socialist economic structure into a market-oriented 
economy. The Cahora Bassa Dam, an independent power producer (IPP), was the 
foundation of the export orientation of the country’s energy sector.137 The reforms that 
came in the 1980s and 1990s reopened the energy sector, and the GoM’s response was to 
favor mega projects to rapidly develop the energy sector. The limited financial capability 
of the state and local entrepreneurs led to further incentives to attract large foreign 
investors to fund the mega projects.138 In contrast, the GoT has taken a stance to 
encourage local small and medium sized enterprise involvement in the development of 
the energy sector.139 Whether inward or outward-oriented, according to Haggard, once a 
strategy is chosen and entrenched it is difficult to adjust course.140  
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The role of the state in Mozambique’s business environment focused on the 
control of resources and the linkages elites have with investors.141 State intervention was 
more in terms of informal networks and negotiations with key actors than protectionist 
reforms.142 Closely related to the political structure that frames the overall development 
strategy, the political competition of elites has shaped the investment climate. The 
president has the ability to award contracts without vetting, and political elites took 
advantage of investment information that is not accessible by many local investors.143 
Liberalization reforms have not improved competition or spurred domestic energy sector 
development as anticipated. The reforms have enabled the political elites to gain personal 
wealth, which perpetuated their commitment to export-led policies.144  
Unlike Tanzania’s privatization strategy that promoted and protected SMEs in the 
energy sector, Mozambique’s privatization process did not favor local entrepreneurs.145 
Investment legislation and the Investment Promotion Center (CPI) were designed to 
facilitate and standardize the investment process, but the vagueness of the law permitted 
the CPI to prioritize foreign investors when it processed business licenses.146 The 
privatization process in Mozambique has strengthened the state by consolidating support 
through awarding party loyalists with contracts associated with energy sector 
development.147 Instead of encouraging private investment in the distribution of energy, 
the GoM has maintained a centralized control of national energy companies, Empresa 
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Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH) and Electricidade de Mocambique (EdM).148 
Keeping the electricity sub-sector nationalized and providing foreign companies with 
access to informal networks in the natural gas sub-sector are ways the GoM advanced the 
export-oriented agenda.149  
Within the natural gas sub-sector, the relative inexperience of ENH in managing 
the sector enabled international actors to exploit Mozambique’s resources. Established in 
1980, ENH has been a political liaison in the energy sector that acts as the primary oil 
and natural gas advisor to the GoM while maintaining a 10% stake in every natural gas 
related project.150 One can argue that ENH’s stake in profits influenced its policy 
guidance to the GoM. Compared to Tanzania where the production sharing agreements 
(PSAs) require 60% royalties and ensure domestic supply is fulfilled prior to export, 
Mozambique has yet to renegotiate existing natural gas contracts or implement a standard 
natural gas PSA.151 
The government’s promotion of energy sector mega projects catered to foreign 
investors that were interested in exporting the energy produced once the projects were 
complete. Mozambique’s infant energy sector is dependent on private industry for 
extractive technology and innovation.152 In return for technology transfer and skills 
training, the GoM provided incentives for foreign investors in the form of long-term 
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corporate tax exemptions and privileged access to decision-makers.153 The investor 
initiated any local content provisions, and the GoM had limited legal precedence to hold 
the foreign companies to the contracts due to the lack of a legal public-private partnership 
(PPP) framework.154  
Private and foreign actors have an advantage in Mozambique’s energy sector that 
does not guarantee increased domestic energy supply.155 Since the economic strategy did 
not foster SME development, there was (and still is) less internal demand to develop the 
domestic energy supply. Additionally, the GoM did not promote or demand foreign 
companies to establish linkages with “upstream or downstream” domestic enterprises.156 
The priority to develop export infrastructure combined with the lack of a local content 
policy favored extractive industry stakeholders. Political elites from all parties have not 
agreed on local content provisions or the role the government should take to protect the 
domestic market.157 Individual contract negotiations can incorporate local content 
requirements, but this is not mandatory.158  
The financial sector also favors energy export projects. Since Mozambique has 
not been as successful in stabilizing its national banking structure like Tanzania, most 
investments are managed through international financial institutions (IFIs). The IFIs are 
more likely to lend to the large corporations that invest in the mega projects promoted by 
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the GoM. Much of the South African investment flows increased lending that favored 
projects that linked to energy projects supporting export to South Africa or South African 
owned enterprises. The significant role South African banks had in shaping investment 
flows will be addressed further in the next section.159  
The government’s incentive to push mega projects and foreign investment 
stemmed from the need for quick revenue to pay for necessary infrastructure. The GoM 
recently purchased the remaining shares of HCB, the country’s largest power generation 
plant, from Portugal.160 The $950 million U.S. price required the government to promote 
energy plans that promoted short-term financial gains.161 Providing investment incentives 
in the natural gas sub-sector facilitated the increase in energy investors. The rapid influx 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the extractive sector has benefited the commercial 
production of natural gas, which has reduced the government’s dependence on the 
domestic tax base for state revenue.162  
Mozambique’s energy sector liberalization did not follow the development 
patterns of NICs. The common development path, even for countries that focused on 
export-led growth, involved initial stages of import substitution and established state 
involvement in the economy to protect the domestic market. The initial stages were 
typically periods of increased investment from foreign investors but the government 
limited the influence of external actors in policy development.163 The GoM diverged 
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from the mold since international companies have significant influence with political 
elites, and the policy influence of external actors has resulted in reforms that 
disadvantaged local SMEs. The GoT took a strategic position by selectively interfering in 
the natural gas and electricity sub-sectors to protect domestic SMEs and limited the 
influence of foreign investors. In Mozambique, even the liberalization within the 
electricity sub-sector benefited outside electricity suppliers. The GoM intended to open 
the electricity supply market to include ESKOM and the Mozambique Transmission 
Company (MoTraCo) in Mozambique’s energy market. There was little financial 
incentive for foreign energy suppliers to invest in Mozambique’s national grid outside the 
development corridors that connect Maputo with South Africa. Expanding the domestic 
grid in Mozambique was (and still is) a risky investment and the only progress in rural 
energy has been in the purchase of off-grid solar panels and isolated micro-grids.164  
The economic strategy of the GoM was a product of the need for political control 
of resources that was conducive to the export of energy. Liberalizing the energy market 
has allowed the political elite to strengthen their business networks with foreign 
investors. The privatization process in Mozambique favored investment in mega projects 
that not only sought foreign investors but also excluded the participation of local SMEs in 
the development of the country’s domestic energy sector. Institutional reforms were, 
therefore, more likely to include beneficial aspects to exporters. Similar to Tanzania, 
Mozambique needed foreign investment for necessary energy sector developments, but 
the main difference was how Mozambique has chosen to prioritize external market 
demand over domestic energy security. 
D. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
In Mozambique, the export of natural resources was a combined result of 
decisions made by competing political elites and the pressure from external agents 
seeking energy resources. The fractured nature of the elites and their need to control 
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access to energy resources have led the GoM to align energy policies with external actors 
because the political support and revenue received made the government less reliant on 
the public to stay in power. Similar to Tanzania, the GoM has fostered relations with 
international organizations, private investors, and global energy consumers that aligned 
with political priorities. Where the two countries varied is in the nature of international 
pressure on the policy decisions of the government. The GoT did not have a history of 
being an energy exporter and, therefore, the elites had the ability to choose partners that 
facilitated the development of the domestic energy sector. Mozambique’s history of 
energy export provided limited incentive for the elites to resist the influence of its 
international partners, like South Africa.165 The GoM selected which donor strategy 
recommendations coincided with the preferences of the political elite.166 While the policy 
priorities aligned, the interests did not coincide with enhancing domestic energy security 
in Mozambique in the near-term.167 This section will address how international 
relationships affected how the GoM chose to utilize its energy resources. 
Mozambique’s resources attract investors and donors of all types. South Africa’s 
demand and influence in the GoM’s policy choices has been consistent, both the 
influence and aid from other international actors have varied since Mozambique’s 
independence. In the past the GoM has been receptive to the conditions set by donors. 
The current trend of bilateral aid is to encourage private industry to provide investment 
and technical assistance to energy sector entities. With the export potential in the 
abundance of energy resources in Mozambique, the private industries have encouraged 
Mozambique’s decision makers to expedite projects that will facilitate export of 
resources.168 Mozambique’s key actors in the energy sector did not have the benefit of 
getting energy sector management assistance through the Power Africa Initiative like in 
Tanzania. 
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Much like Tanzania, Mozambique has a long history of energy insecurity. A 
primary difference was that from the beginning, Mozambique’s energy sector was 
designed to export energy. The first major energy project was the Cahora Bassa Dam 
(HCB), contracted by the Portuguese government in 1969 to export electricity to South 
Africa. Despite being constructed in the northwest region of Mozambique, the 
transmission lines transverse the country and link directly to distribution stations in South 
Africa. Until 2007, Portugal retained over 60% control of HCB and maintained the 
bilateral agreement with South Africa’s energy corporation, ESKOM.169 The long-term 
agreement prohibited the distribution of HCB generated electricity to Mozambique’s 
national grid. FRELIMO elites also shared the profits with Portugal and fostered 
partnerships that both assured FRELIMO’s control of energy resources, and also 
guaranteed that FRELIMO would risk profits by abrogating this agreement that provided 
no energy for domestic consumption.170 
Mozambique has a large, influential energy consumer sitting across its southern 
border.171 South Africa has deeply rooted political and economic linkages in 
Mozambique’s energy sector. Mozambique’s political parties have fostered individual 
relationships with various entities in South Africa. FRELIMO has sought to maintain 
business coalitions with South African investors to consolidate FRELIMO’s control over 
access to energy. RENAMO’s dealings focused on negotiating contracts that increased 
their political support in the Southern Africa region.172 In general, the legacy of trade 
relations has resulted in an unbalanced trade dynamic between the two countries in favor 
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of South Africa.173 As part of the long-term bilateral agreement with ESKOM, 
Mozambican electricity is transmitted to South Africa before connecting to distribution 
lines back into Mozambique. Mozambique electricity customers are then required to pay 
import fees to ESKOM for electricity generated in Mozambique.174 In the current 
economic strategy, SMEs in Mozambique are at a disadvantage when trying to compete 
with foreign industry.  
The linkages with South Africa’s energy companies influenced how the GoM 
developed the country’s energy sector development strategy. ESKOM has a long-term 
bilateral agreement with Mozambique for the export of electricity from the HCB to South 
Africa, which was an extension of the original agreement ESKOM signed with Portugal. 
South African businesses are valuable energy consumers within Mozambique, but 
businesses like Mozal have taken advantage of its close ties with the GoM. Mozal is a 
South African owned enterprise the runs one of Mozambique’s main revenue sources, the 
Mozal aluminum smelter. As part of the HCB agreement, the Mozal aluminum smelter 
was contracted to import electricity through ESKOM. The smelter consumes nearly 
900MW of domestically generated electricity, and the smelter’s energy demand and 
reliable revenue has caused the GoM to prioritize Mozal’s energy demand over domestic 
demand.175 South Africa’s national oil company, Sasol, has a monopoly share of natural 
gas extracted from the Pande and Temane fields, which was granted to it by the 
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Government of Mozambique.176 Only in the long-term objectives does enhancing 
Mozambique’s energy sector occur in the agreement with Sasol.177  
Adding to South Africa’s influence and pressure on Mozambique to export energy 
is the growing significance of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). The SAPP is an 
intergovernmental organization where participating members operate on a memorandum 
of understanding between member countries to provide energy for regional distribution. 
The primary objective of the SAPP, according to the SAPP’s official vision is to “Provide 
a forum for the development of a world class, robust, safe, efficient, reliable and stable 
interconnected electrical system in the southern African region.”178 As the primary 
regional actor, it coordinates an integrated power system and provides a regional solution 
to energy insecurity.179 The expectation is that a regional electricity market will improve 
competition and establish realistic market signals necessary to enhance domestic energy 
security within each of the SAPP partners. Under the guidance of SAPP, Mozambique 
exports energy to power stations supporting the regional grid. After South Africa, 
Mozambique provides the most electricity to the SAPP, supplying 5% of the power (an 
installed generating capacity of 2,279MW). At the same time, Mozambique has the 
lowest percent of domestic electricity access within the SAPP.180  
Without the balanced development of energy sector management and 
infrastructure development, states like China and South Africa can continue to influence 
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the export of energy from Mozambique.181 The lack of a legal framework or governance 
requirements attached to assistance from private investors also allowed the GoM freedom 
to maintain its energy development priorities.182 As private industry assistance increased, 
Mozambique experienced a decline in official development aid (ODA). The decline 
meant a reduction in technical assistance for policy reform and a reduction in the ability 
of states to affect sustainable resource governance.183  
With the increased activity of IOCs operating in Mozambique, the GoM sought 
international organization support to promote the legitimacy of its export-oriented 
policies. Organizations like the World Bank and IMF have provided guidance and 
recommendations to strengthen the government’s energy sector strategy, but the GoM has 
selectively implemented only the recommendations that advance the country’s outward 
focused agenda. An international benchmark for Mozambique’s energy sector came in 
2012 when the EITI officially reported Mozambique as an EITI compliant country. 
Meeting EITI’s compliance requirements does provide public awareness of 
Mozambique’s extractive sector by publishing reported revenues, but it also broadcasts 
the success of the extractive sector to potential investors. The EITI does not favor 
domestic use or export; the initiative works to enhance extractive sector transparency, 
which the public can use to hold the government accountable.184 For the GoM, public 
awareness and compliance with international standard reinforced the linkages with it 
foreign investors and made the government less responsive to domestic demand. 
The relationships with international actors have encouraged the GoM to continue 
its export-led strategy to develop the country’s energy sector. A key factor was the 
prominent influence of the state of South Africa and its agents in the energy sector. 
Unlike Tanzania, the pressure from neighboring countries and participation in the SAPP 
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promoted the export of energy over the development of the domestic energy sector. It 
also appears that because of the need to control access to energy resources, the 
government was selective in implementing policy reforms that countered the national 
development strategy decisions of the central government. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Government of Mozambique’s response to the country’s energy insecurity in 
light of recent discoveries of energy resources has many factors. Mozambique’s energy 
sector has always been a sector of exploitation and export, which has led to a continued 
outward-focused development strategy today. Additionally, the continued political 
tension between FRELIMO and RENAMO has carried over into competition over access 
and control of energy resources. The deep rooted and at times violent tension encouraged 
the export of energy in return for revenue and the ability to restrict distribution to regions 
that support opposition parties. Mozambique’s fractionalized elite differed from 
Tanzania, where there was a consensus among decision makers on how to utilize the 
country’s energy resources to enhance domestic energy security. The competing 
strategies opened the decision-making process to influence from external actors who had 
a significant interest in exporting Mozambique’s energy resources. South Africa, 
especially, had significant influence in how the GoM chose to use its energy resource 
through political and economic pressures to export to the SAPP and South African energy 
enterprises. The international relationships essentially strengthened the political power of 
FRELIMO by partnering in energy sector projects that progressed the ruling party’s 
agenda. The combination of political elite competition and the role of international 
energy investors in Mozambique’s energy sector were primary reasons why the GoM did 





Tanzania and Mozambique demonstrate two approaches to energy security. 
Understanding why a government chose to prioritize domestic supply has policy 
implications for other resource endowed developing countries. Tanzania’s decision 
makers promoted the domestic use of energy resources to enhance the country’s energy 
security, and the success of the inward-focused energy strategy was a result of consistent 
and coherent policies that balanced the influence of energy sector elites and private 
interests. Mozambique’s response to its energy insecurity and recent natural gas 
discoveries presented a case of why developing countries may choose to export energy 
resources before developing the domestic energy sector, reflecting a different political 
logic than in Tanzania. The following sections will summarize the significant points of 
comparison between Tanzania and Mozambique and the energy security implications of 
choosing an inward- versus outward-focused energy strategy. 
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 There are many factors that influence the energy strategy choice of 
countries. The following section presents the key factors that were present in the research 
of the energy sectors of Tanzania and Mozamabique. 
1. Political Dynamics 
The cohesiveness and cohesive nature of elites in Tanzania led the government to 
establish sub-sector policies that have led the GoT to prioritize domestic energy security. 
In Mozambique, the fractured elites were unwilling to share access to energy resources, 
which led the GoM to choose energy export rather than domestic energy sector 
development. The base framework in Tanzania and Mozambique has been that the ruling 
party’s desire to stay in power was an important factor in the distribution of energy 
resources. Tanzania’s CCM party has historically been inward focused, which may 
explain its increased appointments of programmatic elites devoted to domestic energy 
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development.185 Mozambique’s government, on the other hand, was predominantly made 
up of political elites from FRELIMO and RENAMO that were divided on how to develop 
the energy sector.186 
Tanzania’s dominant party has managed to create cohesion among its political 
elites. One of the reasons behind the government’s consensus to focus on domestic 
energy supply was the influence of programmatic elites in the decision-making process. 
In Tanzania, the programmatic elites were committed to the national development 
objectives and have established consistent policies that resulted in domestic energy sector 
development. Whereas, Mozambique lacked a strong group of programmatic elites and 
the president reduced the amount of technocrats appointed to political positions 
associated with the energy sector. From the research, it appears that the distribution of 
energy across party lines did not threaten CCM’s political power, while in Mozambique it 
threatened FRELIMO. Distribution of energy as a program objective rather than political 
reward indicated that CCM did not have to maintain tight control of the energy resources 
and could afford to share control of the energy resources. Delivering electricity and 
energy resources to the population, both priorities of the BRN Initiative, gathered public 
support for the GoT.187 The public support strengthened the elite’s position in 
government, which is also kept the CCM as the dominant party.188  
Mozambique’s decision to focus on export was a direct result of the resource 
competition between FRELIMO and RENAMO elites. In Mozambique, competing for 
political power and control of resources became the latest source of political leverage.189 
The GoM lacked cohesion among political elites on how to develop the energy sector, 
and the individual interests that drove elites to seek to control over access to energy 
resources also fractured the internal organization of the political parties. What has 
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occurred because of the competition was a continued reliance on informal networks to 
secure access to influential energy sector actors.190 The export of energy resources 
ensured political elites would remain in power and revenues were directed to ensure the 
passage of FRELIMO’s agenda. 
2. Economic Strategy 
The influence of the national economic strategy on the government’s choice of 
energy strategy was closely linked to the political factors affecting policy decisions. 
Going into this study, the expectation was that sub-sector economic policies would align 
with the macroeconomic strategy. In Tanzania and Mozambique, the macroeconomic 
strategy was not the direct cause of the government’s choice in energy strategy. How 
each country implemented sub-sector policies did provide an explanation of how the 
governments chose either an inward or outward-oriented energy strategy. In Tanzania’s 
case, the cohesive elite were able to implement energy policies that aligned with the 
macroeconomic strategy because of the willingness to share access to energy resources. 
Mozambique’s fractured elite implemented sub-sector policies that countered the market-
oriented strategy and made the government susceptible to policy influence from external 
actors.  
Previous studies on economic strategy show that it is difficult for a government to 
switch priorities once an inward or export-oriented strategy is chosen.191 Following a 
market-oriented strategy assumes that countries will open economic sectors to private 
industry to improve competition and efficiency. Correlating the national economic 
strategies with the energy strategies in Tanzania and Mozambique demonstrated that each 
country’s energy development policies supported the respective inward versus export-
orientation of the respective national economic strategy in each country. Therefore, when 
it came to liberalizing the energy sector, Tanzania and Mozambique differed in their 
implementation: Tanzania privatized with a strategy that developed the internal energy 
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sector, while Mozambique prioritized the export industry, providing little focus or effort 
to develop the internal energy sector.  
Tanzania’s national economic strategy was a byproduct of an inward focus 
established after independence and international structural adjustments programs. The 
GoT appeared to take its cues from the success of the Asian NICs with selective state 
intervention in certain economic sectors.192 The government’s decentralization policies 
reflected the commitment to the macroeconomic strategy and the incorporation of the 
energy sector into to the national strategy. The GoT’s strategic role instead of centralized 
control of energy sector enterprises removed government from business and gave 
decision makers incentive to develop policies that would improve efficiency and revenue 
of the domestic market.193 The influence of programmatic elites and cohesion among 
decision makers may explain why the GoT chose to establish energy sector policies 
consistent with the inward focus of the national strategy. 
In contrast, the GoM sought to directly control the energy industry. This resulted 
from FRELIMO’s unwillingness to give up control of access to resources and revenue 
from energy exports. This aligned with an overall macroeconomic strategy that promoted 
export-led growth. Where the framework for a market-oriented economy was to privatize 
sectors, the government’s control of energy enterprises and business contracts 
counteracted the liberalization goals of the national strategy.194  
The influence of macroeconomic strategy on the choice of energy strategy was 
not consistent across Tanzania and Mozambique. The expectation going into this study 
was that decision makers would base energy sector development choices on the national 
development strategy. There are observed similarities in either an overall inward- or 
export- focus but not the liberalization of the energy sector in accordance with a market-
oriented economy. Maintaining centralized control indicated that the political control of 
business and resources in Mozambique was a stronger influence on energy strategy 
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choice than the objectives of liberalizing the economy and creating a competitive 
domestic market. Tanzania’s decision makers in comparison seemed to establish energy 
policies based on the national economic strategy. As a result, Tanzania has experienced 
an increase in domestic investors in the energy sector and implementation of policies that 
ensured local SMEs had the opportunity to compete with foreign companies. 
3. International Relationships 
As developing countries, both Tanzania and Mozambique are dependent on 
foreign investment. Being reliant on international actors opens the respective 
governments to unbalanced policy influence by those actors.195 As the research shows, 
the influence of other states and private enterprises in the policy development process has 
the potential to reinforce the agenda of the dominant party and the objectives of the 
national development strategy.196 
Since the 1990s, Tanzania has been closely linked with Western partners that 
have focused on building energy sector management capabilities and enhancing energy 
security.197 The international relationships fostered by the GoT reinforced its decision 
maker’s prioritization of domestic energy supply while they also encouraged public-
private partnerships in the development of the energy sector.198 
The policy influence that foreign states and private industry have in the energy 
policy development process was a significant factor in Mozambique’s choice to export 
energy. Mozambique has a long history of foreign actor influence in the energy sector. 
Agreements and contracts negotiated prior to independence shaped the energy sector 
policies. Notably, the GoM’s very close ties with the Government of South Africa, 
several South African energy enterprises, and the SAPP have had significant effects on 
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energy sector policies.199 The relationships between political elites and international 
actors were important for state revenue and political support. FRELIMO’s control of 
energy resources and reliance on informal negotiations has led to energy policies that 
continue to support large foreign investors and mega-projects. 
C. ENERGY SECTOR IMPLICATIONS 
What appears from the comparison of Tanzania and Mozambique is that domestic 
energy security is a choice influenced by multiple factors. Improving domestic supply 
requires a commitment of the decision makers to implement coherent and consistent 
energy policies that prioritize domestic development. Enhancing domestic energy 
security resulted from governments with a cohesive elite that are focused on using the 
energy sector to develop broad-based performance legitimacy. For other developing 
countries, establishing a political environment that produces a cohesive elite focused on 
sharing control of energy resources may be the biggest obstacle in the process. As long as 
political parties continue to use the external distribution of energy resources as a means 
of securing political power, developing countries will restrict domestic energy supply and 
will focus on seeking revenue from export. Countries like Mozambique will then be more 
susceptible to the influence of external actors in the energy sector and have less incentive 
to respond to the needs of the population. 
While economic strategy alone cannot explain the choice of energy strategy, it 
does provide insight into how political dynamics influence economic aspects of energy 
sector policies. Elites committed to consistent national objectives do not have to rely on 
negotiating individual access to resources, whereas fractured elites tend to resort to 
informal processes that undermine domestic energy sector development. The importance 
of establishing coherent policies such as local content policies (LCPs) for natural gas, 
public-private partnership (PPP) frameworks, and production sharing agreements (PSAs) 
ensures the domestic energy sector will benefit from increased foreign investment. The 
lack of coherent policies is often a source of confusion for the private sector and creates 
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an unstable investment climate.200 In Tanzania’s case, by formalizing the negotiations for 
energy and limiting the policy influence of international partners, it appears the 
government is willing to risk losing some foreign investment interest with implementing 
policies that ensure domestic development. Mozambique’s informal negotiations allow 
private enterprises to take advantage of the government’s dependence on investment to 
set contracts that favor the investor. For developing countries to enhance domestic energy 
security, governments should establish policies that promote privatization in the energy 
sector and ensure local SMEs have the opportunity to compete. 
Another implication of the choice to prioritize domestic energy supply over 
export is the benefit of diversifying a country’s energy sector. As observed in Tanzania 
and Mozambique, developing countries tend to depend on a single source of energy for 
domestic supply. With the discoveries of natural gas, these countries have an opportunity 
to harness the resources to diversify their energy sectors. Tanzania’s choice to prioritize 
the use of natural gas for domestic consumption has increased access to modern energy 
for its domestic consumers. The restructuring of the energy sector has also encouraged 
the development of IPPs that have access to various energy resources. The combination 
of liberalization in the energy sector and implementation of energy policies has allowed 
Tanzania to increase efficiency and competition in the energy sector. The progress may 
be slower than anticipated, but it is proof that aligning domestic policies with 
international interest can enhance domestic energy security. By comparison, 
Mozambique is still heavily reliant on hydropower to fuel the economy while exporting 
natural gas that could also be used to satisfy domestic energy demands. 
For Mozambique to enhance the domestic energy security many changes need to 
occur. One recommendation would be for the GoM to implement sub-sector economic 
policies that facilitate the development of local SMEs in the energy sector. Improving 
access to resources and financing to local energy enterprises can increase internal demand 
for energy supply and provide incentives for the GoM to be more responsive to pressure 
from the local population to enhance domestic energy security. Another recommendation 
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is for the government to establish a LCP for natural gas. The policy promotes more 
mutually beneficial natural gas contracts and ensures Mozambique retains energy 
produced to fulfill the growing domestic energy demand. The earlier recommendations 
could make the GoM less susceptible to pressures from external actors to export energy 
and more capable of managing the emerging energy sector. 
Tanzania’s energy sector is progressing but it is far from meeting the long-term 
development goals. A key factor in the country’s enhanced energy supply is the increase 
in SMEs in the energy market. The energy projects and IPPs that the local SMEs 
developed provide resources to small portions of the population, for IPPs to be a long-
term solution to enhancing energy security the GoT needs to maintain its programmatic 
commitment to the domestic energy market. As Tanzania becomes an energy producer, 
the demand from neighboring countries is expected to increase. Adhering to the 
economic strategy and energy policies the government implemented can prevent elites 
from being influenced by the demand of external actors to prioritize the export of energy. 
Since the discovery of natural gas can both enhance domestic energy security and 
foster economic growth, the continued commitment by governments to manage energy 
sectors is necessary. As the world has observed in other developing countries endowed 
with energy resources, developing countries with weak energy strategies and institutions 
are susceptible to the resource curse. Further research needs to be conducted to see the 
long-term impacts of the energy strategies chosen by Tanzania and Mozambique. If the 
strategy to prioritize domestic energy supply results in greater long-term enhanced energy 
security than countries that prioritize export, then one will be better equipped to advise 
countries seeking to enhance their domestic energy security. 
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